THE BATTLE OF HASTINGS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ANGLO-NORMAN ENGLAND

THE NORMAN INVASION

September 1066 AD. William the “Bastard” had waited for the wind to back south-erly, and vainly watched the weathercock on the church of Saint Valery. In despera-tion he had the saint’s relics brought from the church and paraded about, and the wind obligingly shifted direction. There is some dispute about the date of embarkation, but it was probably on the 27 September. The ships would have had to be brought up to shore during high tide so that the horses could be embarked using ramps; high tide was at 15.20. The army swarmed down to the waiting ships in order to leave before low tide. Poitiers asserts that the fleet left before sunset, which suggests somewhere about 17.00. Low water in the Somme estuary has been estimated at 20.56 GMT and, because of the shallowness of the water at this time, the ships would have had to leave well before this time, assisted by out-flowing tidal currents. This would have allowed the fleet to reach Pevensey, 56 miles across the Channel from the estuary mouth, early the following morning. So as not to reach it until daylight, and to allow the ships to form up once beyond the Somme estuary, a short delay at anchor was necessary. Tidal streams caused a partial westerly curved sailing course for part of the way. William led the fleet in his own ship, the Mora, the gift of his wife. The prow bore the figure of a boy with an ivory trumpet. A lantern was slung high on the masthead as a guiding beacon, and the sound of the horn signalled the advance. Perhaps all had lanterns to prevent collisions, and probably sailed in staggered rows. The Mora was so swift that she pulled ahead of the rest and at dawn the Duke found himself alone in the Channel. Mindful of the morale of his men he ordered breakfast washed down with wine, as if in his own chamber at home, while he waited for the rest of the fleet to catch up. Gradually the forest of masts appeared and the fleet moved towards the coast of Sussex a county of southern England.

In 1066 AD Pevensey Bay in Sussex consisted of a tidal lagoon separated from the sea by a shingle bank and set with small-cultivated islands, which at low tide were separated by mud flats and water channels but possibly connected by causeways. On the western side of the bay a peninsula jutted into the lagoon, with a sheltered harbour behind. On this three mile spit of land the Romans had built a stone fortress called Anderida,* which by 1066 AD was partly ruinous. There was also the small town of Pevensey.

Probably at some time before 09.00 GMT (Low Water was about 09.20) the first Norman vessels arrived at the lagoon. They would have had to negotiate a large gap in the shingle bank and manoeuvre past the mud flats until they came into the harbour under the north wall of the fort, where there were probably wharves. It seems likely that the Duke’s ship and those carrying the horses, and the fighting men designated for a garrison at Pevensey would have been landed here. By low water the level had dropped twenty feet, allowing ships to be beached on the muddy flats so exposed.

Some chroniclers mention that disembarkation took place at intervals along the shore, or that the shore was seized. Although one need not attach too much importance to this, it is possible that many ships ran up onto the shingle bank.

Although writing a century later, Wace gives a good impression of what may have been the tactical disembarkation;

William of Malmesbury, followed by Wace, tells the story of how William the “Bas-tard” fell as he stepped ashore,* but that the potentially bad omen was turned to good effect when a nearby knight remarked how the Duke had the earth of England in his hands. The horses were probably made to jump into the shallows.

Once disembarked, the Normans busied them selves in fortifying the Roman remains by cutting off one corner with a ditch and timber defences. However, William decided to move eastwards along the coast to Hastings. Why he initially landed at Pevensey is not known for certain. Perhaps he was attracted by the lagoon; perhaps the fleet was swept too far west by cross-currents. Two vessels had been separated, probably landing at Old Romney to be killed by the inhabitants. Saxon (English,) men and women were extremely dangerous by modern standards. And there are several instances of Normans being killed by local peasants. All of who would still carry the seax fighting knife, but would also have been very warrior like. Probably while at Pevensey Bay William and 25 knights had searched unsuccessfully for a passage presumably across the mud flats, for the distance around the perimeter of the lagoon was 26 miles and there was no serviceable road eastwards from Pevensey. If landings had taken place on the east of the shingle bank, William perhaps ordered the march to Hastings the same day and may not even have disembarked part of his cavalry, but let it pass down the coast instead.

The English town of Hastings now lies under water in the area of the pier. In 1066 there was a high peninsula where William set up camp. His men erected a timber cas-tle, possibly within the English burgh (a style of round defended position,) on the hill. Foragers were sent out and scouts posted to warn of the English approach.

By moving to Hastings William showed that he intended to approach London via the road to Dover because the route through Chichester along the South Downs would have meant starting from Pevensey. The entire area of the Hastings peninsula made a secure base as it was difficult access for an army. To the west was the Bulverhythe lagoon, to the east the marshy valleys of the rivers Brede and Rother, which curved round northwards towards the great forest called the Andreds weald, which was cut by boggy streams and local tracks. A Roman road, probably much neglected, ran from Rochester through the forest and would need fording the Brede to reach Hastings. However, a track passed between the watercourses and out of the peninsula to meet the road farther northeast. Although William could reach London from Rochester, the Norman cavalry would have been at a serious disadvantage by using a route that passed through woodland. Alternatively, he could turn eastwards to Dover and the coastal route.

*The same fortress of Anderida, Anderitum, Andredes, mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles for the year 477 AD, sacked by the Suth Seax leader Ælle and his Englisc war band, leaving not one Briton alive within.

William could have struck out for London in the hope of securing it before Harold returned from the north but a march inland or along the coast might have allowed Harold to sever his lines of communication. By staying in the peninsula with only one route out and a constricted entrance, he had a secure base. Neither did William wish to tarry for long. As they set up camp the Duke was approached by a messenger from a kinsman who had settled in England, Robert, son of the lady Guimora. He informed the Duke of Harold’s great victory in the north and advised him to remain within en-trenchments and not to offer battle. However, William the “Bastard” had no other choice, he had everything to gain, but also everything to lose, he had to force a confrontation in the open, where he could use his cavalry to best effect. Otherwise the English fleet might well cut off any escape to sea and Harold could block the road to London, seal the Normans in the Hastings peninsula and wait until the Norman sup-plies ran out, while the English army increased in strength. Knowing this, and know-ing Harold’s temperament from their meeting probably in 1064, William deliberately set about devastating the surrounding area in an endeavour to lure him to battle. Sus-sex lay in Harold’s old Earldom and such destruction was an insult to his lordship. It also brought William the “Bastard” fresh supplies.